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second qestion calls for psychological experimentation, the first question can be answered with mathematical tools. The present article shows that the mathematical characteristics of linear optimization models impose severe restrictions on the functions evaluating choice alternatives such as gambles, multi-attributed outcomes or consumption streams. The course of proof of this argument provides a helpful tool for sensitivity analyses in decision theory. The concepts and methods are demonstrated m examples from statistical decision theory, psychological modeling and applied decision theory. ** r-i s ^x muueiing.
Introduction
Decision theoretic models, such as expectation models, multi-attribute utility modelf, or time-discounting models, evaluate decisions or decision strategies with a real numVjp d index of preference such as a utility, a present value, risk, expected value, etc. Most prominent decision theoretic models are linear decomposition models that base their evaluation of choice alternatives (a generic term for gambles, multi-attributed outcomes, and consumption streams) on a weighted additive integraHon of subjective or objective input parameters, which the decision maker or experts provide by means ,f simple choices or judgmental tasks. For example, the subjective expected utility model evaluates gambles by combining subjective probabilities of events and utilities of decision outcomes into expected utilities.
One of the peculiarities of linear optimization models is the flatness of their evaluation function in the area of optimal choice alternatives. (We implicitly assurn.-: here and in the following that ch:i?e alternatives have a continuous or dense numerical description as vectors, decision functions, stopping rules, probability cutoffs, etc.) A suboptimal choice does not seriously hurt the decision maker as long as the alternative selected is not grossly away from the optimum. This type of insensitivity is closely linked to a second type, which It often found in decision analysis settings. Variations of model parameters like importance weights or subjective probabilities seldom produce drastic changes in the model evaluation function. A set of quite different parameter values may lead to the selection of the same choice alternative; and even if the use of a wrong set of parameter values leads to a different decision, the
first type cf insensitivity will guarantee that the loss in expected value as _ calculated by means of the model with the correct parameters will be rather small. Some researchers ("intema and Torgerson, 196l) .iave even argued for an insensitivity across models. According to their results different models should-under some mild conditions-lead to similar evaluations and decisions.
Although there are doubts about insensitivity across models (see Fischer, 1972 ) the evidence for the two other kinds of insensitivity is substantial.
In expectation models v. Winterfeldt and Edwards (1975) A function may look flat, but that can easily be fixed by stretching the units I of the ordinate and compressing the units of the abscissa. Flatness is not a mathematical, but a psychological concept. 5% loss may be substantial for one decision maker and negligible for another.
These arguments call for two kinds of research on the flax maximum phenomenon: first, a mathematical analysis that proves the inevitability of restricted forms of the evaluation functions, given certain model characteristics, and second, an experimental psychological analysis that shows whether or not these rcctrletiont can bo ini, "preted M Platnetf« The arguments and proofs are quite technical, but all theorems have a simple intuitive meaning, and except for theorem 3 they seem self evident. Rather than boring the reader with messy mathematics, we will rely on self-evidence whenever possible, and confine ourselves to interpretation. The reader interested in more mathematical detail should consult the two references cited. For illuo'ration a scoring rule example will accompany all theorems and proof armaments.
We want to study the behavior of the model evaluation function U which is defined over a set of choice alternatives X = [x,^,z, ]. For example, X may be a set of gambles, decision functions, or multi-attributed outcomes; U may be a utility function or an expected utility function. In our scoring rule example X will be a set of probability estimates which are gambles by the definition of a scoring rule; U is the subjective expected value (SEV) of those gambles.
The application of a linear decomposition model to such a choice situation requires each x to be described as an n-tuple of elements x , characterizing x for a specific aspect or state S^ of the choice situation. We assume therefore that x has the following representation:
For example, x may be a Ramble in which one receives a dollar amount .^ if event S occurs; or a multi-attributed outcomes with value x in attribute S^ i or a cash flow in which one receives a dollar amount x ± at timr S^ Note that by labelling we implicitly let the number of states be finite. This finiteness of the state space will be our first assumpt^n (Al) for the further mathematical development.
Linear decomposition models go farther by defining utility functions u i within each state S so that each choice alternative can now be characterized by i a vect:r of single state utilities:
According to our second assumption (A2) these utilities are bounded, i.e., m ^ u.(x.) ^ M for all i and x a X, and some real m,M.
Furthermore, ,in linear optimization models a weight vector w from a parameter set W associates with each state S^^ a weight w^^ which can be interpreted as a subjective probability, an importance weight, or a discounting rate. In expectation, time discounting, and multi-attribute models we can assume thftt w > 0 and E w = 1.
The linear model evalmvtr \ choice alternatives x now by computing the scalar product w o u of the vectc rs u and w, or more simply as the weighted average:
That alternative x* Is optimal, which maximizes U, i.e., ^he decision rule of linear optimization models is:
"choose x* with U(x*,w) > U(x,w) for all x t X"
We will define U*(w) = ü(£»,ir ) 12) i.e., U* is the maximal attainable utility for a specific weight vector w. In statistical decision theory x* would be called a Bayes decision with respect to the prior distribution w.
Let us interpret the previous paragraph in the scoring rule situation, assuming a simple two state case, in which S and S are two mutually exclusive and exhaustive events, w and w are the associated true subjective probabilities 2 (SP's). The set of choice alternatives X is a subset of the real plane R , ^-Our whole argument will be based on maximazation. The dual argument based on minimization is basically the same.
Schematically the scoring rule paradigm is represented in Table 1. (» (5b)
Insert Table 1 about here Here, of course, U*(w) has a very clear interpretation: U*(w) = U(x*,w) = U(w,w).
Before we enter into a discussion of the behavior of U and U*, we need to state two preliminary theorems, which will establish a relation between the parameter set W and the choice set X.
THM 1 Assuming that the state space if finite (Al) and that the u.(x ) are bounded (A2), there exists for every w f W at least one x e X such thac U(x,w) = U*(w).
We will define the subset of X, which contains those elements x which are otpimal under w as X , and elements of X as x . A similar theorem is proven in w w -v: The second theorem is more sophisticated and, in fact, substantial work is based on it in decision theory. To state it, we first have to introduce the notion of dominance (here in a somewhat wider sense than usual). We call a choice alternative x dominated, if there exist other alternatives y_ and z and a real number a (0 < a < 1) such that
(1) u i (x i ) < au^y. ) + (iHl)tt (• J for all i and (W) The set of non-dominated alternatives is called admissible. We label the admissible subset of X as X, and we will assume in the following that X = X (A?).
THM 2 Given Al, A2, and A5, there exists for all x e X at least one w e W such that U(x > w) = U*(w).
Similarly to theorem 1 we will define the subset of W which contains those parameters w which would make x an optimal choice W , and elements w e W we will call w . This theorem is rather difficult to prove and requires a substantial number of "lemmas'" such as the famous separating hyperplane theorem.
The idea of theorem 2, however, is simple: admissible choice alternatives are potential candidates for optimal choices.
Theorems 1 and 2 allow us to step freely from the parameter set W to the choice set X and back in our analysis of U as a function of both, w and x.
The main purpose of these theorems here is to establish an equivalence between parameters and choice alternatives for the insensitivity analysis.
Both theorems have a simple interpretation in our scoring rule example.
Since here X = W and, by definition of a proper scoring rule X = X, the theorems say that for each true subjective probability vector w, there is an optimal probability estimate y, and for each estimate x there is a subjective probability vector w which "ould make this estimate optimal. In fact, we already knew that, since the unique value x = w was the Lest estimate in the SEV sense. The latter equality follows from the distributivity of "0." Again by theorem 1 there exist y and z t X such that U(^,v) = UMv) (7) and
,:
and U*(w) > U(x,w) = wou(x) it follows by substituti-m that (10)
What does this theorem mean in our scoring rule example? Defining U*(w)
as U*(w ), we see that IT* is severly restricted through the boundaries and by convexity. Figure 2a gives some examples of graphs of U* functions which might have been generated by some scoring rule (actually, Ü* is equivalent to some Insert Figures 2a, 2b , and 2c about here scoring rule). Figure 2b shows inadmissible graphs. Figure 2c shows the U* function for our quadratic scoring rule. The interpretation of convexity in this example is very intuitive: the more certain you are about the events S , the better your optimal decision will be in terms of SEV.
We know now that U* is a restricted function of w, but whet about U as a function of x? With theorems 1 and 2 it becomes simple to step from U* to U.
U has two arguments, w and x. We know that U is linear in the w 's, thus as a function of w U defines an n-1 dimensional hyperplane. In the rcoring rule n-1
we will lose
The convexity of U* puts limits on the differences between the U*'s as well as on the slopes d . Since, in addition (w^ -w. ) cannot exceed 1 (and will i iy ix typically be much smaller) the loss AU will remain small.
Hbx meh will we lose if we base our decision on a parameter value v when, in fact, the true value is w? We would choose x such that
We will receive (16)
and consequently we will lose
Two general expressions may be helpful for limiting purposes: the maximum possible loss is determined by
where e and f are the unit weight vectors with e = 1 and f =1. See * * k / the cornerpoints U*(e ), tnen determine U*(w) where w is the "least favorab?.e" weight vector which would make a minimax choice optimal. Then find some other points of U* and exploit the convexity property to approximate the whole function. Alternatively U* can be approximated by plotting some U -lines.
This procedure can be clone graphically in two state cases. In cases with a larger number of states computer aid is needed. Equations (19) and (20) give some boui.aary losses, and equation (l^) ^termine for each particular case the potential losses. In general: the flatter U* as a function of w, the flatter U as a function of x will be around its maximum.
To summarize this section: First we established a relation between the parameter set and the choice set in two therorems by making three assumptions.
We assumed that the state space is finite (Al) , that the single state utility functions are bounded (A2), and that the choice set is admissible (A5). Then we showed that under Al and A2 in linear optimization models the function U* is severely restricted by its boundaries and through convexity. Finally, we demonstrated the restrictions on the actual evaluation function U as a function of U* and outlined a general approach to sensitivity analysis using the properties of U*. Insert Table ? about iiere amount of :aoney the decision maker stands to lose under S (see Table 2 
As in the scoring rule example, we ha re in this paradigm a "; : 1 mapping from prior probabilities w into the choice alternatives x. As it is well known ß*, the optimal likelihood ratio criterion for the payoffs given is We see how the flatness of LT» prevents this loss from beinp; large, v. Winterfeldt and Edwards (1972) showed in a direct analysis of the U-function, that U is generally flat in signal detection situations.
A Multi-Attribute Example Assume ^hat we have two attributes on which we evaluate riskless options, say job offers. Attribute S may be salary, C may be staff benefits. We have five offers, each of which has been evaluated by a utility function u in each
Insert Table 5 about here attribute (see Table 5 ). We can immediately delete x since it is dominated: 5 ü(z) = I a(^) + l ü(x U ) " (8, 10)
i.e..
I.
u 1 (z i )>u i (x ) and tt g (l ) > U (x )
All other alternatives are admissible. U* in thir case will be piecewise linear, and its construction is rather easy. We Just plot all the functions 
(see Figure 9 ). Naturally U» is defined by the line segments of U such that u (*!>"■,_) > u (* »V for all j.
r ■ ■ mimmmmmmm (in Figure 9 marked by the solid line). Assume now that we choose x for Insert Figure 9 about here w 1 ■ V 2 « Figure 9 also indicates what we will stind to lose.
Similar analyses can be done with any matrix like the one in Table 5, as we find them in time discounting models or simple decision analysis problems.
For more than two states giaphical representations become impossible, and computer aid is needed. In those cases one s lould use the approach of bounding losses by the slopes and points of U* as sketched In the previoas section. .69 Table 5 Multi-attributed outcomes 
